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1. Rhetoric and Contemporary Studies of Science 
The rhetoric of science is so far a small but proud scholarly field that 
seeks simultaneously to contribute to rhetorical studies and to secure a 
place for rhetoric in the conversation of–to use a broad and not 
exclusively owned term–science studies. We want to be mindful of both of 
those fronts. The approach of rhetorical studies to argumentation, 
including scientific argumentation, recognizes that, no matter how valid 
their reasoning or how strong their evidence, speakers must command 
authority with audiences and that audiences bring a lot of baggage with 
them to the context-dependent rhetorical situations in which they 
encounter rhetorical activity. Accordingly, rhetoricians of science take 
seriously the role of rhetorical choices, including the use of tropes and 
figures, narrative accounts, genre expectations, and terministic framing to 
shape conversations about science.  
The field owes its gratitude to pioneers such as John Angus Campbell, 
Lawrence Prelli, Alan Gross, Randy Allen Harris, Jeanne Fahnestock, 
Carolyn Miller, and others who made this or related points at a time when 
the reflective study of science was still dominated by history and 
philosophy of science. Within the narratives of these more prestigious 
disciplines, the scope of rhetoric was pretty much confined to public 
communication of scientific results. The epistemic grounds of scientific 
claims were located elsewhere.  
Since then, studies of science have taken so decidedly a discursive and 
social turn that logical-formalist philosophies and internalist histories of 
science are no longer taken seriously by nearly anybody (with certain 
exceptions that both these authors know all too well). This development 
raises two interlinked questions. One is whether the social-discursive turn 
in the study of science has taken full advantage of rhetorical theory and 
criticism in articulating its alternative to philosophy of science. The other 
is whether we rhetoricians of science have taken full advantage of the 
opening created by the broader discursive-social turn to articulate, 
deploy, and advertise our distinctive yet varied approach.  
If one were to cast a net in the waters of rhetorical studies of science 
and technology, one would capture quite a range of projects in the last 
 Depew and Lyne  Poroi 9,1 (April 2013) 2 
several decades. These include but are not limited to: (1) rhetorical 
analysis of major scientists; (2) the rhetoric of scientific genres; (3) 
rhetoric within specific scientific fields; (4) the rhetoric of science-related 
controversies; (5) inventional practices in science; (6) controversy-strewn 
episodes in the history of science; (7) public appropriations of scientific 
terms; (8) language and figures within science; (9) incommensurability 
and demarcational relationships among disciplines; (10) rhetoric and 
philosophical rationality; (11) the uses of scientific expertise; (12) the 
rhetoric of medicine, (13) rhetoric and materiality; (14) the rhetoric of 
risk; (15) visual rhetorics of science; and (16) the mythic rhetorics of 
science and religion.1 Collectively, these writings represent contributions 
to the theory, criticism, and history of rhetoric. And we can be proud of 
the many variations on a theme. But the studies do not follow a single 
program or share a specific agenda. Rhetoric is opportunistic and unruly, 
and we cast our nets where we think the fishing is good. Is this a problem? 
This is a fair and timely question. What would it mean to be part of a 
unified agenda, and what principles might provide that unity? Or, by 
contrast, might we embrace the concept of repertoire and still remain 
aspirational? Is that enough?  
Perhaps it is an aspiration to find a common framework that leads us 
to draw upon other fields. Many among us want to make common cause 
with Bruno Latour, for example, and it is encouraging that this most 
prominent proponent of social studies of science does himself make use of 
the term rhetoric to describe the transactions that resulted in, for 
example, the pasteurization of France or the exportable, packaged bits of 
sellable knowledge generated by words as much as by deeds at places like 
the Salk Laboratories (Latour, 1988). Let us quote Latour in reference to 
the R-word. “Rhetoric,” he observed, “is a fascinating albeit despised 
discipline, but it becomes still more important when debates are so 
exacerbated that they become scientific and technical” (Latour, 1987, p. 
30). We note, too, that Latour’s own rhetoric is fascinating to us. For 
instance, his thought experiment of ontological egalitarianism in which 
things as well as persons take part in the wrangling of a great parliament 
may have helpfully challenged the assumption that persons alone are 
articulate and things just get pushed around (Latour, 1993, 2007). Even 
as this exercise strains credulity, it leads to valuable insights. Still, 
Latour’s inventional spark is so bold that its very success has caused him 
difficulties in convincing people that his case studies support local, 
context-dependent forms of scientific empiricism and realism. This is not 
the wholesale social constructionism most of his readers, especially the 
lazy ones, expect to hear.  
We largely agree with Latour about going local and about robust 
contextualization. We also sympathize with his exasperated assurances 
that science does not either in fact or in his view reduce to textualism. Yet, 
here is a point at which the rhetorical perspective leads us to the 
                                                        
1 We invite the reader’s perusal of the references in Appendix A. 
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contentious but attractive claim that the rhetoric of science contextualizes 
science better than does the sociology of science because the latter tends 
to reduce arguments to context rather than defining context by argument. 
This is for the rhetoric of science a key point. It means that context is a 
very flexible concept; it embraces the discursive as well as the material. In 
this and related matters, perhaps we rhetoricians of science can engage 
the social studies of science to mutual benefit, and in the process fulfill 
the expectations that led our founders to form this association. 
Perhaps Kenneth Burke’s pentadic devices for distributing agency 
would add something of value to Latour’s argument. One of those five 
terms is “scene.” G. Thomas Goodnight’s threefold distinction between 
personal, technical, and public spheres of discourse, which is itself a 
rhetorical reconstruction of Habermas’s theory of communicative action, 
can help frame the scene in which the kinds of transactions Latour posits 
take place (Goodnight, 1982). If you see it this way you will observe that 
only under very particular, very contingent, and very hard to sustain 
conditions, such as those that obtained in post-War America, can modern 
societies support the degree of phase separation among these three 
discursive spheres that grants serene autonomy to the technical sphere in 
ways philosophers of science tend to take for granted. Why otherwise 
would the intrusions of creationists and climate science deniers seem like, 
well, intrusions? Rhetoricians know better. The boundaries between 
discursive spheres are not natural. They are constructed and maintained 
by ongoing rhetorical activity, and even at their best, they leak at the 
seams.  
If there is one theorem that we rhetoricians of science have sustained 
in ways that have suffered little back talk, it is that demarcation or 
boundary-work between science and society; between science, non-
science, junk science, and pseudo-science; and between various scientific 
fields themselves is irreducibly rhetorical. We are thinking of the work of 
Charles A. Taylor (1997) and of Thomas Gieryn (1999). Efforts of 
philosophers to try to find purely logical, Bayesian probabilistic, and 
other methodological ways of demarcating have been in vain. Still, the 
main implication of recognizing that demarcation is essentially rhetorical 
is both inescapable and hard to hear even for some of its supporters. 
Unless you define the technical sphere in a way that is both question-
begging and hopelessly unreal, it must be admitted that there is nothing 
in principle that prevents junk science and pseudo-science from being 
hatched in and passed out by reputable technical sphere venues. Nor is 
there anything in principle that prevents public sphere discourse from 
putting the burden of proof on what comes out of the mouths of scientists.  
Both of these things in fact happen. It was not scientifically 
scrupulous progressives or scientists themselves, for example, but 
benighted big city Catholic politicians who did the discursive spade work 
that put the brakes on the eugenic laws in this country.2 The laws were 
                                                        
2 See Kevles (1985, pp. 118-119). The Catholic hierarchy opposed eugenics 
not on scientific but on ethical and theological grounds. It thus put a view 
 
 Depew and Lyne  Poroi 9,1 (April 2013) 4 
not only supported by scientists and political progressives; they had been 
proposed by them in the first place.  
Rhetoricians are well-equipped to study cases like these because there 
is in them a strong sense of how contexts, events, politics, and traumas 
are integral and intertwined factors in the trajectories of scientific 
research programs. At present, many in our field are worried, with good 
reason, about how good science is being blocked by political opposition. 
We do not want to forget, however, that it has sometimes been scientists 
who have blocked good sense. One sometimes hears that we needn’t 
worry about such misadventures as eugenic laws anymore because that 
was the result of bad science, while we, unlike the people of a century ago, 
practice good science and would never makes such mistakes. (Well, at 
least we wouldn’t use eugenics as an authorizing term if we did.) Such 
complacency does not seem to be justified by history. Nor is the view that 
deviations like that can go on only for a while, since there is a built-in 
mechanism in scientific rationality that inevitably corrects for 
ideologically-inspired errors like eugenics laws or Lysenkoism in Stalin’s 
Russia. That isn’t quite how it happened in either case.  
2. Optimism About Science—and About 
Democratic Discourse  
Reflecting on histories like these, some science studies folks (largely 
constructionists) have drawn on what they call “the pessimistic 
induction,” according to which science never gets good enough to rise 
above the weak forms and norms of evidence that presumably haunt 
public and personal spheres of discourse. If this is so, the hope of the 
middle class regimes that first took power in America and Europe in the 
1830s that science would serve as a corrective for the democratic 
institutions they were promising to erect would indeed be in vain. 
Irrationality would reign. Historically, in fact, we find just such bursts of 
                                                                                                                                         
into circulation in the American public sphere that later found support 
from scientists. There were, of course, geneticists who dissented from 
eugenic programs, both positive and negative, in the 1920s and 1930s 
because they didn’t think you could isolate environmental and genetical 
factors in human populations. Or even if you could, they doubted that you 
could objectively determine which traits are to be selected for and against. 
But these objections were pragmatic, not principled. There was a huge 
institutional connection between genetics and eugenics that was not fully 
broken even when Theodosius Dobzhansky provided compelling 
arguments in the 1940s that eugenics is not only impractical but 
biologically incoherent. Unlike the Galileo case, the Catholic Church got 
this one right, albeit not on scientific grounds. Other churches, especially 
those affected by modernist progressive movements, did not, including 
the Episcopalians and Methodists. This case does not mean that publics 
are presumptively right. They are most certainly not when it comes to 
creationism. But that’s just the point. You never can tell until you look at 
the particulars in all their complexity. 
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irrationality accompanied by epistemic pessimism, even nihilism, at times 
and places where pseudoscience thrives and democracy collapses, as it did 
in Germany in the 1930s.  
But what if rhetoricians of science made it their special charge to 
point out that this may be a false dichotomy? And conversely, what if 
public discourse is not always and antecedently dismissed as deficient in 
rationality? Even if its forms and norms of rationality are different from 
those of science, is it not possible, indeed likely, that public 
argumentation is rational enough to mix it up with science in productive, 
if also messy, ways? What if scientists, in order to live up to their loudly 
proclaimed devotion to rational inquiry, were asked reflectively to 
confront and reject their own prejudices, as feminist philosophers of 
science have, for example, been asking them to do with some success in 
recent years?  
In that case, might one draw a different, more optimistic induction 
from the histories that on scientistic assumptions stimulate the 
pessimistic induction? Consider the case of eugenics again. If in the end 
things did go well, we think it was because criticism in democratically 
structured public venues inspired criticism in technical ones, which 
eventually destroyed the genetics arguments on which eugenics was 
predicated and prepared the ground for the reception of these arguments. 
It was because scientists shared the intuitions of untutored publics that 
they looked for and found empirical arguments that validated their 
intuitions. Their critique, first intimated by advocates of religion, then 
supported by scientists committed to liberal egalitarianism, turned into a 
tidal wave in the wake of revelations about Nazi science. Celeste Condit 
has shown that, aside from serving as a stigmatizing term, use of the term 
eugenics virtually ended—but, we add, it did so completely only when the 
story of its rise and fall was told in public venues by people like Daniel 
Kevles in the 1980s.  
In sum, because we rhetorical scholars are not antecedently 
contemptuous of public sphere and personal sphere forms of discourse, 
we are more upbeat about truth-finding, or at least falsehood-
extinguishing, in technical sphere venues. Maybe our civic instincts make 
us comfortable with the idea that science is too important to be left to the 
scientists. While there is no magic guarantee that errors will be flushed 
out of science, we believe that the arc of a vigorous cross-sphere practice 
of rhetorical criticism of scientific claims, evidence, assumptions, and 
implications tends to bend toward truth, albeit situated and localized 
truth—just as Martin Luther King reminded us that the long arc of 
democracy bends toward justice. To those skeptical of appeals to truth 
and justice on such a large scale, let us at least offer this alternative: Good 
rhetoric, like good science, helps in rooting out falsity and injustice, which 
are far more plentiful. 
3. Discovery and Proof: An Inventional 
Continuum 
What justifies our optimism that rhetoric can be as good for science as it 
can be for justice? It is partly because, along with Fahnestock (this issue), 
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Prelli (this issue), and others, we think that rhetoric (both as advocacy 
and as criticism) is an organon, a tool that is productive of knowledge. It 
extends the tentacles of conceptual grasp. It is as epistemic in its force as 
the rhetoric-baiting Plato and the anti-rhetorical Platonists after him took 
logic and mathematics alone to be.  
Here we give a tip of the hat to Richard McKeon’s call for rhetoric to 
be an architectonic productive art, even if, localists that we are, we do not 
share the grandeur of his ambition (Depew, 2010; Hauser & Cushman, 
1973; McKeon, 1971). During the post-War heyday of the philosophy of 
science, it was big news to assign to rhetoric, as he did, a role not just in 
marketing scientific discoveries to non-expert audiences but, more 
deeply, in inventing ideas that it also plays a role in subjecting to 
confirmation and falsification. McKeon made that case by pointing out 
that the logical empiricist and the Popperian distinction between the 
context of discovery and the context of justification is a riff on the ancient 
rhetorical distinction between invention and arrangement. As Jeanne 
Fahnestock pointed out in her excellent earlier review, Iowa’s Project on 
the Rhetoric of Inquiry (POROI), with which both of us have been 
associated, was and is more or less dedicated to reviving rhetorical 
invention in and especially across fields of inquiry, including science 
(Fahnestock, 2008). 
Considered rhetorically, invention in science, as in other forms of 
inquiry, can’t be thought of in isolation from justification at all; rather, 
the two comprise at most dialectical poles in the dynamics of inquiry. 
Invention is a shared social practice, not the private, purely psychological 
process to which philosophers invidiously confined it in order to put the 
accent instead on logical justification. When one invents, it is with an eye 
toward how the invented argument, framing, or interpretation might hold 
up under the scrutiny of an audience. And sometimes that audience, 
including the internalized audience that any well-socialized inquiry leans 
upon, sends the inquirer back to the drawing board. Indeed, the critical 
audience (e.g., another scientist or an external critic) might not just 
challenge an explicit argument but also, for example, challenge the use of 
a dominant metaphor, which then puts it within the space of investigation 
and productive inquiry. While we understand that a metaphor is never 
precisely true or false, a metaphor that is apt for a particular phenomenon 
under inquiry can open whole new vistas, while a bad one can really gum 
up the works. So metaphors too can be, and often are, challenged and 
tested.  
All of this makes the activity of inquiry less like a monologue than a 
dialogue. The scientist is, so to speak, putting down steppingstones as he 
or she goes, with each step testing them with one foot. Those scientific 
ideas that make themselves clear enough to count as testable hypotheses 
do so in and through debates about their merits. The process of stating a 
claim is inseparable from justifying it. What philosophers like to call 
justification, as opposed to discovery, is the perspicuous deductive display 
after the fact, rather like what rhetoricians once called arrangement. It 
may seem otherwise, as when we hear about crucial experiments like 
Michelson-Morley that dispose of an issue once and for all. But closer 
inspection shows that in such cases what has happened is that critical 
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discussion has reached a point of satiation, that is, a point at which prior 
discourse has generated a well-formed issue that precludes the usual 
posing and talking past each other. The crucial experiment is both 
invented and tested within a field of argument, in this case whether a 
light-carrying medium, the ether, exists or does not. The same experiment 
in a different rhetorical situation would mean very little.  
The rhetorical productivity that we have inadequately described 
comes into focus as soon as we recognize that knowledge production 
necessarily takes place in the space of implicit or explicit controversies 
(Goodnight, 1982). All controversies, whether they are scientific, political, 
or religious, find their natural medium in rhetorical argumentation, both 
on the side of advocating claims and on the side of criticizing them. This 
point turns out not to be trivial. It implies, for one thing, that the meaning 
of claims and the persuasiveness of evidence for and against them are 
essentially entangled with the claims they contest and the evidence for 
and against them. This is primarily what we mean by the localness of 
inquiry. Controversies are rhetorically situated.  
4. Embedded Rhetoricity  
What do we see when we look closely at such scenes of contestation? We 
see the productive interplay of competing accounts, models, 
configurations, narratives, metaphors, emphases, and authorizing terms. 
Let us look a bit more closely at a few of these.  
Working as both of us do in the rhetoric of evolutionary biology, along 
with our esteemed colleagues John Angus Campbell and Leah Ceccarelli, 
we see the rhetoricity of ostensibly demonstrative scientific prose 
everywhere. Let’s look at a couple of the ways this happens in a field that 
raises passions because it overlaps not only public and technical spheres 
of argumentation but also engages the personal sphere as well, where the 
meaning of life and the value of interpersonal relationships make 
themselves most felt.  
Selective Examples as Good Evidence 
Ever since Aristotle, let us recall, we have known that examples play a key 
evidential role in rhetorical argumentation as is very prominent in 
evolutionary biology. Evolutionary arguments rest, in fact, on persuasive 
examples: archaeopteryx, black and grey pepper moths, the heterozygotic 
superiority of blood cells that confer some immunity to malaria, and 
others. We are aware that these examples, which appear over and over 
again in textbooks, stand in for, and offer promissory notes on behalf of, 
many other similar cases that, authors assure us, will eventually turn up 
to confer general significance on the examples. We are aware, too, that, 
while similar cases often do show up, they are seldom enough to turn a 
case study into a general model or even less often to turn a good model 
into a law-governed theory. Neo-positivist philosophers of science like 
Alexander Rosenberg (1994) worry about this enough to conclude that 
evolutionary biology, let alone the social sciences, is not and never can be 
law-like enough to be a real science.  
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As rhetoricians of science, however, we have a more equable attitude. 
We are not in the least scandalized by the fact that examples are 
perspicuous and paradigmatic because they are described in terms of 
images, analogies, metaphors, and other tropes. Why, in a specific context 
of inquiry, did Dawkins have to say that DNA is “selfish” if he wanted to 
make the point stick with those he was addressing that it is more 
explanatory and more parsimonious to look at natural selection as 
operating on behalf of genes than on behalf of the organisms that contain 
them? There are, or at least were in the 1970s, good reasons for saying 
this. The characterization made certain newly discovered facts intelligible. 
At the same time, selfishness and Darwinism, when combined, bring a lot 
of extra baggage with them too. Examples are perspicuous only when 
criticism blunts their tendency to become excessively persuasive, as this 
one did when Dawkins took it so seriously that he thought he had to 
defend materialism and atheism in order to protect his interpretation 
when its kairotic moment had passed (Depew, 2012). 
Authorizing Terms 
Persuasive examples, we think, are closely tied, when their force is spelled 
out, to authorizing terms. Here we encounter an issue about which the 
two of us talk a lot. The connection between local cases and high-level 
theories is so open that authorizing terms like “Darwinism” are not forced 
conclusions, but independent variables. Why do evolutionary scientists 
think they have to call what they are doing “Darwinism,” especially since 
that term packs so much baggage that the insistence of scientists on it 
does more than anything else to keep creationism or intelligent design 
alive in the space of controversy as alternative authorizing terms? One of 
us tends to think that the ideograph “Darwinism” has been so poisoned by 
its history that it might be better to give it up altogether. What would be 
lost, he asks, if the scientific community took, say, a “Lamarckian” turn? 
Would this not let us see what experimental biologists are showing all the 
time these days? Genomes, it seems, are surprisingly sensitive to 
environmental changes. With more ease than would have been thought 
possible in the heyday of Francis Crick’s “central dogma” (right: dogma) 
of molecular biology, they can intensify the rate at which genetic 
variation, the fuel of natural selection, occurs and can even hatch up 
regulatory sequences, micro-RNAs, epigenetic markers, and other bits of 
ontogenetic machinery to respond to environmental changes (Jablonka & 
Lamb, 1995).  
Still, we have to admit that Lamarckism lugs along some baggage too, 
such as Lysenkoism.  Accordingly, the other of us is inclined to follow the 
lead of Theodosius Dobzhansky, whose genial and inviting rhetoric has 
been studied by Leah Cecarrelli (2001), in hoping to show the public that 
natural selection is actually a benign process that does not carry the 
negative connotations associated with so-called “social Darwinism.” 
Which of us is right? We are not sure. What we are sure of is that this 
discussion puts the phenomena we are studying in the right, that is, the 
rhetorical, light. In that light, “Darwinism” and “Lamarckism” are 
authorizing terms. 
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Presumption and Burden of Proof  
No one, we hope, will construe our remarks as anti-science. So we take 
the opportunity to express our agreement with Celeste Condit that 
rhetorical scholars, in opposing scientism and its philosophical defenders, 
are ill advised to buy into an anti-science stance. Just as we do not think 
creationists should colonize evolutionary biology by making it conform to 
their worldview, neither do we think that literary humanists should be 
allowed to do something similar. We are afraid that social 
constructionism has fallen into that trap, and that this has been 
encouraged by certain trends in rhetorical theory. We hope we have given 
you reasons to see why we think we have evaded that approach. 
We may put our point differently by noting something else about the 
rhetorical character of scientific argumentation. Since it is embedded in 
rhetorical occasions, scientific criticism, whether by scientists or informed 
others, is permeated by judgments about where presumptions and 
burdens of proof lie at any given time. These always favor maintaining or 
restoring a certain judicious balance between innovation and tradition. 
Accordingly, being a rhetorician who is pro-science does not require 
granting presumption to the latest thing to come out of scientific fields, 
especially fields that are clearly in an incipiently inventive stage. Among 
these are behavioral and cognitive genetics. The impulse to extend 
evolutionary biology to these topics runs very deep. But the track record 
of earlier attempts to bring these topics under scientific, even techno-
scientific, control is very poor, and the burden of proof remains on them.  
The assumption that this burden is currently shifting is based on the 
idea that we now know enough about genetics to do the job. This 
assumption is probably wrong; or, even if it is right, it shows that we also 
need to know a lot about other things as well, such as development and its 
intersection with culture. So caution is advisable. Caution is particularly 
advisable because public sphere books and articles tend to place too great 
a value on particular discoveries that might have, we are always told, 
revolutionary implications. The language of a “gene for this” or a “gene for 
that” falls into this class of journalistic effects. In the technical sphere, 
however, things seldom, if ever, work that way. The latest and biggest 
thing soon turns into a single data point in an array that continues to 
change. The lesson is that rhetoricians of science must know enough 
about what is going on in the technical sphere to be able to address, and 
judge properly, its relevance to the public sphere. Rhetoric is about 
judgment—in science as in other dimensions of discourse.  
5. Inventing on All Cylinders 
Our emphasis on the productive role of rhetoric in the sciences has so far 
focused on how criticism fosters the growth of knowledge. But the 
productivity of rhetoric so considered also affects how we should think of 
inventing new hypotheses. That is, the rhetorical dimension of scientific 
activity makes us look to the question of how invention is doing work 
within science in ways that support many of the traditional aspirations of 
science in modernizing societies.  
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Ever since the early days of rhetorical theory, topical and stasis theory 
has proven to be one useful way of thinking about invention. It has proven 
no less fertile in the sciences. Francis Bacon’s view of scientific method 
was in fact an extension of the a-technical rhetorical proofs to scientific 
inquiry in a context of political improvement. Baconians might from the 
start have been more attuned to rational-discursive or technical rhetorical 
proof as well—ethos, pathos, and logos—and hence to the integral role of 
discourse of science that we have advocated. The motto of the Royal 
Society, nullius in verba, may be well taken as dissociating science from 
the decorative rhetoric of the day. But it is not in the least true about the 
role of rhetorical argumentation in science as it subsequently developed 
in modern societies. It has been full of ethos, pathos, and logos. 
Thankfully, the palette is slowly expanding in rhetoric of science work 
today and more generally in the work of contemporary science studies.  
In the view we are advocating, invention, as we have already said, is 
not sudden inspiration. It is a process in which leads and topics are 
explored in as creative and systematic a way as Edison, for example, 
explored them (Bazerman, 2002). Because the inventional process is a 
critical, context-dependent practice, it does not stand in contrast to 
discovery or of proof. It is a process of discovery and proof. Since on this 
point we want once again not to play into the hands of those who might 
dismiss us as advocating some kind of effete textualism, we might picture 
a kind of spectrum on which discovery lies at one end and invention at the 
other, with most cases closer to one end than the other. In saying that a 
previously unknown species has been “discovered,” we register that 
something ontological does indeed seem to be at stake, pulling us back 
from going as far as Latour when he maintains that microbes did not exist 
until Pasteur discovered them (Latour, 1988).  Invention in our usage 
does not carry that force or implication. What it carries is the implication 
that when something gets called a discovery, a process of discourse has 
been found so persuasive that talk moves on to other things in which the 
discovery is taken for granted—although in principle it is re-visitable. 
Below are a few dimensions of the inventive process as productive work in 
evolutionary biology, and mutatis mutandis, in science generally. 
Inventing Counter-Examples 
In debates over biological evolution, the use of carefully selected examples 
has often performed extensive rhetorical work in the advocacy of different 
explanatory models, as we have noted. As we say, the textbooks provide 
ample testimony of examples that have become so obligatory that they 
have exemplary status as standing for other similar things. Their 
persuasive function is that of metonyms or synecdoches: stand-ins for an 
entire underspecified class of other such things presumed to be “out 
there.” One might think of this process as inventional and the 
corresponding practice of offering counter-examples as critical. But our 
way of thinking about invention suggests that there are just as many 
productive, inventive possibilities in scouting out counter-examples. 
Generating counter-examples is close to the core of scientific inquiry. It 
breaks up the rush to generalization that is inherent in using examples as 
paradigm cases. It is no surprise that Dawkins’s selfish genes provoked 
 Depew and Lyne  Poroi 9,1 (April 2013) 11 
researchers to find cases of group selection as counter-examples and that 
finding them has led to new truths about the biological, and especially the 
human, world.  
Inventing (and Expanding) the Scope and Texture of Context 
Not all rhetorical criticism should be tied to current circumstances. This is 
why Isocratean rhetoric, structured as it is by the pressing concerns of the 
kairos moment, is probably not enough for a satisfactory rhetoric of 
science. Nor is the kind of political reductionism we find in Shapin and 
Shaffer’s Leviathan and the Air Pump (1989). In the context of the 
sciences, the pertinent circumstances are not just today and tomorrow. 
Rather, they pertain to a long-range trajectory in the pursuit of inquiry 
and should not be tied too closely to the ups and downs of political life. 
Nor should science be measured by how fast it produces technologies 
either, as seems to be the current zeitgeist. What used to be called basic 
research, for instance, is now often called “curiosity science.”  This is a 
very powerful act of renaming, because it makes concern for the long-
term future seem like a kind of diversion, and thereby re-contextualizes 
those concerns. The concern with local context does not in the least 
contravene science’s orientation toward the long run.  
Inventing Names  
The phrase “curiosity science” points to our next type of invention. 
Naming, mis-naming, and re-naming can be very powerful indeed. As 
Kenneth Burke (KB) put it, “A way of seeing is a way of not seeing” 
(Burke, 1984, p. 49).  Burke was right about this point. Did you notice 
how fast some of the fast food chains capitulated when a particular 
substance in their hamburger patties was re-named “pink slime”? That 
was a brilliant rhetorical move, and a good counter-example to 
deterministic ways of thinking. Did you notice how support for the 
inheritance tax went down once it was re-named a “death tax”? Are these 
not in some ways similar to (and also different from) certain rhetorical 
moves emanating from the sciences—we’re looking at you, “selfish gene” 
and “the Modern Synthesis”—even if there are generally more stringent 
checks on unfettered invention and more specificity to the available 
means of persuasion in those provinces? Names can be, as Fahnestock 
(2008) says of rhetorical figures in science, “figures of thought” (see also 
Fahnestock, this issue). 
Here is a case very much to KB’s point. Public attention has recently 
been called in a most dramatic way to that part of the genetic material 
that does not code for DNA, which is to say, most of it. The term “junk 
DNA” was coined in 1972 and has fanned out, first among prominent 
biologists and subsequently in widely across the general culture. Yes, this 
name was chosen to reflect a view, widely adopted at the time, that non-
coding parts were also nonfunctional parts. In that sense and context, the 
term arguably did productive work in crystallizing the theoretical outlook 
that led to full understanding of the so-called genetic code, “coding” and 
“programming” being metaphorical terms that advanced this very local 
research program. But as that view gradually lost scientific credibility by 
its very success, leading to the epigenetic revolution that is upon us now, 
whole segments of the evolutionary biology community, in thrall to a 
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name, remained largely blind to a revolution within the most respected 
precincts of molecular biology itself that has pointed to the importance of 
(noncoding) regulatory genes. The term “junk” continues to sustain a 
blinkered view of what genes are all about. This orthodoxy has borne 
down on many scientists as well as on that part of the public who read 
about such things. Change the names and you invent a better, truer 
future. Naming is framing. (The term, “dark matter” has been used in 
reference to noncoding genetic material. We are intrigued by the 
overtones and possible rhetorical destiny of that term.)  
But naming has more systemic uses as well. One of these is in the 
maintenance of authorizing terms, the terms under which research 
programs are legitimated. On the matter of supporting a program by 
advocating for a term, Dawkins could not have said it better: “My 
contribution to the idea of the selfish gene,” he wrote, “was to put rhetoric 
into it and spell out its implications” (Dawkins, 1995, p. 76). Dawkins here 
offers a stunningly direct acknowledgement of—indeed, an embrace of—
the rhetoricity of his project. This process of embracing a term and then 
justifying it occurs right in the thick of scientific theorizing, which 
Dawkins’s inventional process also did, in addition to reaching a broader 
public. These discursive processes are going on all the time. So, for 
instance, as “autopoetic” theory bids for respectability in evolutionary 
theory, it relies on the name to do a lot of the work of coalition-making, 
opponent-defining, and concept-aligning, even as its arguments are not 
static. In that sense, the term is a call to “think this way.” Advocates will 
search for reasons to support that way of thinking, and opponents will put 
forth reasons for not thinking that way. That’s how it goes. 
Inventing Within a Dialogical Frame  
Let us bring to bear on the topic of invention our earlier insistence that 
science takes place within the space of implicit or explicit controversies. 
This being so, we should resist the tendency to think of scientific rhetoric 
as something that is monological, or something merely to be mapped, or 
something apprehended as text. Scientific arguments move forward by 
encounters with professional resistance, alternatives, counter-
interpretations, arguments about the reproducibility of results, theoretical 
or conceptual adjustments, biases, cultural and ideological resistance, and 
funding issues. They also move on the harnessed energy of theories, 
programs, technological promises, reputations, funding, and aspirations. 
These things constitute the rough ground that is presupposed in the 
discourse of science. We should be alert to the events and traumas that 
affect the movement of science as it responds to them. One of the 
challenges for competing accounts, in evolutionary biology and elsewhere, 
is to find ways of putting the dominant metaphors into some kind of 
dialogical relationship. This represents an inventional challenge for 
evolutionary biology particularly, and other fields generally.  
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6. Need We Be Unified?  
In her companion position paper to this one and others, Celeste Condit 
(this issue) has once again acted to stimulate democratic debate. In her 
survey, it is the purpose of studying the rhetoric of science and 
technology—not, as in ours, the process—that is given primacy; explicitly 
so in two of the categories of work covered in her overview: the purpose of 
building theory and the purpose of improving scientific rhetoric. These 
are purposes that we both can and in our way do sign on to, as we have 
been trying to suggest. The other two categories Condit has identified and 
summarized starkly as “science bad” and “science too powerful,” might 
better be described as matters of “attitude” rather than purpose, and her 
point about the attitude rhetoricians of science should take toward them 
is our point too. Implicit in these two attitudes is oppositional motivation, 
and so it seems to have answered in advance and hence slightly begged, 
the question, “To what end?” or perhaps “In the service of what?” is this 
work undertaken?  
Condit is no doubt right, however, to surmise that some members of 
our community share in the view of science against which she warns us. 
Here it seems that we rhetoricians of science and technology may have 
differences among us as a community of inquiry that have not been very 
well thematized and debated in our field. It is a situation we might rectify. 
As nothing unifies like an attack from the outside, Condit (this issue) 
points to a looming threat from the outside as a motivation to pull us 
together. We believe her concerns are well justified. If the very conditions 
under which we work are endangered, then rallying to preserve and 
protect values even more basic then the value of rhetoric of science is—as 
the physician might say—“indicated.”  
There is also risk in defining our purpose in political terms. Here we 
need to tread carefully. Nothing undercuts the credibility of scientific 
claims faster than when the messenger is seen as acting with political 
intent. Witness the extraordinary hit that belief in global warming took in 
public opinion after the “climategate” emails were politically exploited. 
And there are similar risks within academic institutions. We believe, for 
example, that the normative meta-theory adopted by advocates of STS has 
come at some cost to their credibility in some quarters (Collin, 2010). If 
we sign on to a set of political objectives in studying the rhetoric of 
science, do we risk activating ethos-damaging blowback? And, if so, is that 
a risk worth taking?  
As diversity seems to be a good thing in both ecology and evolution, it 
might have some advantages for those who have been constructing an 
environmental niche for rhetoric of science. Work thus far has been 
highly varied in character. Perhaps that pluralism should be embraced 
rather than taken as a sign of weakness. Steve Fuller’s view that we need a 
strong program in rhetoric of science, analogous to the strong program of 
social studies of science and technology, has some appeal (Fuller, 1995).  
We have done little, however, to relieve his predictable exasperation 
about the fact that we haven’t endorsed this view or this analogy in this 
position paper. As a rhetorical framing, a strong program should beat out 
a weak program every time. But if we take the metaphor of niche 
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construction as a heuristic, diversity need not equate to weakness. Fuller, 
after all, would have us follow him into places we might not want to go.  
7. Parting Thoughts 
Michael Pollan (2007) wrote a well-regarded book, The Omnivore’s 
Dilemma, for which the title sets up his central question: Since humans 
can eat just about anything, how do we—meaning those of us who have 
the option of choosing—decide what to eat? How we answer that question 
has implications not just for our health, but for our environment, our 
ethics, and our politics as well. The contemporary rhetorician has a 
similar dilemma. When the world is your field, it’s hard to know what to 
feast upon. We exaggerate slightly, if at all, in suggesting that rhetoric has 
taken the world and all that’s in it —and potentially in it —as our field of 
concern.  
The rhetoric of science has always lent itself to interdisciplinarity, but 
at times it seems to have its sights set on omni-disciplinarity. If other 
fields offer powerful explanations for the way things work—sociology, 
psychoanalysis, philosophy, neuroscience—then many of us want to 
harness power like that. From a historical viewpoint this is to be expected, 
as conceptions and practices of rhetoric have over the centuries been 
shaped by the social, political, and epistemic biases of their times. 
Moreover, rhetoric tends to gravitate to the centers of power and to adapt 
according to what that power is—the church, the king, the assembly, 
public opinion, funding agencies, and so on—for that is where it can 
matter most. We should therefore expect that the very powerful forces of 
science are magnets for rhetoric.  But as rhetoricians we should want to 
be careful not to give up on the idea that there is power in rhetorical 
invention, for good or for ill, that it should be studied and engaged, and 
that this study need not be outsourced to other disciplines. If we succumb 
to determinisms that relegate discourse to the level of epiphenomena, we 
would do well to get on the wagon of some other field, such as sociology, 
economics, psychoanalysis, or neuroscience.  But otherwise not.  
Now rhetoric invites these fields, and practically all others, to help it 
see the terrain on which discursive interventions occur. But at the same 
time, it need not fade into the woodwork as it draws on the expertise of 
other fields. POROI was more or less founded on that understanding. It 
was an assumption of those who founded ARST, too, and we believe it is a 
shared assumption of most of those interested in the rhetoric of science 
and technology, including authors who, like ourselves, have worked 
collaboratively with folks from other disciplines. We have advocated for 
more attention to how rhetoric can be productive within science. Our 
perspective is that this process does not happen in a hermetically-sealed 
technical sphere, just as its consequences certainly do not confine 
themselves there. And that means that our perspective is very much pro-
science—and just as much pro-rhetoric.  
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Appendix 
The following are examples from each of the variations on rhetoric of 
science studies that we have enumerated. Neither the categories of 
variation nor the exemplars are fully represented here. We used a version 
of Chicago style so that authors’ full names appear. 
1. Studies of major scientists include:  John Angus Campbell, “The 
Polemical Mr. Darwin,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 61 (1975): 375-390; 
John Angus Campbell, “Scientific Revolution and the Grammar of 
Culture: The Case of Darwin’s Origin,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 72 
(1986): 351-76; Leah Ceccarelli, Shaping Science with Rhetoric: The 
Cases of Dobzhansky, Schroedinger, and Wilson (Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press, 2001); G. Mitchell Reyes, “The Rhetoric in 
Mathematics: Newton, Leibniz, Their Calculus, and the Rhetoric of the 
Infinitesimal,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90 (2004): 163–88; J. 
Zappen, “Francis Bacon and the Historiography of Scientific Rhetoric,” 
Rhetoric Review 8 (1989): 74–88. 
2. Studies of the rhetoric of scientific genres include:  Charles 
Bazerman, Shaping Written Knowledge (Madison, WI: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1988); Carol Berkenkotter and Thomas N. Huckin, 
Genre Knowledge in Disciplinary Communication  (New York: 
Routledge, 1994); Alan Gross, The Rhetoric of Science (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1990); Alan Gross, J. E. Harmon, and M. 
Reidy, Communicating Science: The Scientific Article From the 
Seventeenth Century to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002); Greg Meyers, Writing Biology: Texts in the Social Construction of 
Scientific Knowledge (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1990); Jack Selzer, ed., Understanding Scientific Prose (Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1993). 
3. Studies of rhetoric within particular scientific fields include: 
David Depew, “The Rhetoric of Evolutionary Theory, “ Biological Theory 
6.1 (2012): 1-10; Henry Howe and John Lyne, “Gene Talk in 
Sociobiology,” Social Epistemology 6 (1992), 1-54; Jordynn Jack and L. 
Gregory Appelbaum, “‘This is Your Brain on Rhetoric’: Research 
Directions for Neurorhetorics,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 40 (2012): 
411-437; Zoltan P. Majdik, Carrie Anne Platt and Mark Meister, 
“Calculating the Weather: Deductive Reasoning and Disciplinary Telos in 
Cleveland Abbe’s Rhetorical Transformation of Meteorology,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 97.1 (2011) 74-99; Carolyn Miller, “The Rhetoric of 
Decision Science, Or Herbert A. Simon Says,” in Herbert W. Simons, ed., 
The Rhetorical Turn: Invention and Persuasion in the Conduct of 
Inquiry (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 162-186; James 
Wynn, Evolution by the Numbers: The Origins of Mathematical 
Argument in Biology (Anderson, SC: Parlor Press, 2012). 
4. Studies of the rhetoric of scientific and technological 
controversies include: Leah Ceccarelli, “Manufactured Scientific 
Controversy: Science, Rhetoric, and Public Debate,” Rhetoric & Public 
Affairs 14 (2001): 195-228; Nathan Crick and Joseph Gabriel, “The 
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Conduit Between Lifeworld and System: Habermas and the Rhetoric of 
Public Scientific Controversies,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 3 (2010): 
201-223; Thomas Lessl, “Heresy, Orthodoxy, and the Politics of Science,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 74 (1985): 18–34; John Lyne and Henry F. 
Howe, “Punctuated Equilibria: Rhetorical Dynamics of a Scientific 
Controversy,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 74 (1985): 18–34; Lisa 
Keränen, “Mapping Misconduct: Demarcating Legitimate Science from 
‘Fraud’ in the B-06 Lumpectomy Controversy,” Argumentation and 
Advocacy 42 (2005): 94-113; Gordon R. Mitchell and Marcus Paroske, 
“Fact, Fiction and Political Conviction in Science Policy Controversies, 
Social Epistemology 2-3 (2000): 89-107; Gordon Mitchell, Strategic 
Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Policy in Defense Advocacy (East 
Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2000); Marcus Paroske, 
“Deliberating International Science Controversies, Uncertainty and AIDS 
in South Africa,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 95 (2009): 148-170. 
5. Studies of rhetorical invention in science include: John Angus 
Campbell, “Scientific Discovery and Rhetorical Invention: The Path to 
Darwin’s Origin,” in Herbert Simons, ed, The Rhetorical Turn: Invention 
and Persuasion in the Conduct of Inquiry (Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990); Alan Gross and William Keith, Rhetorical 
Hermeneutics: Invention and Interpretation in the Age of Science 
(Albany, NY: SUNY, 1997); Lawrence J. Prelli, A Rhetoric of Science: 
Inventing Scientific Discourse (Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1989); Herbert Simons, The Rhetorical Turn: Invention 
and Discovery in Conduct of Inquiry (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990). 
6. Studies of episodes in the history of science include: Lisa 
Keränen, Scientific Characters: Rhetoric, Politics, and Trust in Breast 
Cancer Research (Tuscaloose, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2010); 
Jean D. Moss, Novelties in the Heavens: Rhetoric and Science in the 
Copernican Controversy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1993); 
Dale Sullivan, “Galileo’s Apparent Orthodoxy in The Letter to the Grand 
Duchess Christina,” Rhetorica 12 (1994): 237-264. 
7. Studies of public appropriations of scientific terms include: 
Celeste M. Condit, The Meanings of the Gene: Public Debates about 
Human Heredity (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999); 
Marita Gronnvoll and Jamie Landau, “From Viruses to Russian Roulette 
to Dance: A Rhetorical Critique and Creation of Genetic Metaphors, 
Rhetoric Society Quarterly 40 (2010): 46-70. 
8. Studies of language and figures within science include:  
Jeanne Fahnestock, Rhetorical Figures in Science (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Thomas Frentz, “Creative Metaphors, 
Synchronicity, and Quantum Mechanics,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 12 
(2011): 101- 128; E. F. Keller, Refiguring Life: Metaphors of Twentieth-
Century Biology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Scott 
Montgomery, The Scientific Voice (New York: Guilford Press, 1996); 
Carol Reeves, The Language of Science (London, England: Routledge, 
2005). 
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9. Studies on incommensurability and the relationships among 
disciplines include:  Randy Allen Harris, The Rhetoric of 
Incommensurability (West Lafayette, IN: Parlor Press, 1997). 
10. Studies of rhetoric and philosophical rationality include:   
M. A. Finocchiaro, Galileo and the Art of Reasoning: Rhetorical 
Foundations of Logic and Scientific Method (Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
Reidel, 1980); Henry Krips, J. E. McGuire, and Trevor Melia, eds., 
Science, Reason, and Rhetoric (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1995); Steven Fuller and James Collier, Philosophy, Rhetoric, and 
the End of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2003); 
Jean D. Moss and W. A. Wallace, Rhetoric and Dialectic in the Time of 
Galileo (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2003); 
M. Pera and W. R. Shea, Persuading Science: The Art of Scientific 
Rhetoric (Canton, MA: Science History, 1991). 
11. Studies of the rhetorical uses of expertise include:  Thomas B. 
Farrell and G. Thomas Goodnight, “Accidental Rhetoric: The Root 
Metaphors of Three Mile Island,” Communication Monographs 48 
(1981): 270–300; Johanna E. Hartelius, The Rhetoric of Expertise 
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011); James W. Hikins and Richard 
Cherwitz, “On the Ontological and Epistemological Dimensions of 
Expertise: Why ‘Reality’ and ‘Truth’ Matter and How We Might Find 
Them,” Social Epistemology 24 (2011): 291-308; John Lyne and Henry F. 
Howe, “Rhetorics of Expertise: E. O. Wilson and Sociobiology,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 76 (1990): 134–151, Damien Smith Pfister, “Networked 
Expertise in the Era of Many-to-many Communication,” Social 
Epistemology 25 (2011): 217-231; Zoltan Majdik, “Judging Direct-To-
Consumer Genetics: Negotiating Expertise and Agency in Public 
Biotechnological Practice,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 12.4 (2009): 571-
606. 
12. Studies of the rhetoric of medicine include: Michael Hyde and 
J. McSpiritt, “Coming to Terms With Perfection: The Case of Terri 
Schiavo,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 93 (2007): 150–78; Lisa Keränen, 
“‘Cause Some Day We All Die’: Rhetoric and the Case of the ‘Patient’ 
Preferences Worksheet,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 93 (2007): 179–
210; John Leach and Deborah Dysart Gale, eds., Rhetorical Questions of 
Health and Medicine (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2010); Judy Z. 
Segal, Health and the Rhetoric of Medicine (Carbondale, IL: University of 
Southern Illinois Press, 2005); Celeste M. Condit, “Women’s 
Reproductive Choices and the Genetic Model of Medicine,” in M. M. Lay, 
L. J. Gurak, C. Gravon, and C. Myntti, eds., Body Talk: Rhetoric, 
Technology, Reproduction (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
2000), 125–41. 
13. Studies of rhetoric and materiality include: Celeste M. Condit, 
“Race and Genetics From a Modal Materialist Perspective,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 94 (2008): 383-406; John Lynch, “Articulating 
Scientific Practice: Understanding Dean Hamer’s ‘Gay Gene’ Study as 
Overlapping Social, Rhetoric, and Material Registers,” Quarterly Journal 
of Speech 95 (2009): 435-456. 
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14. Studies in the rhetoric of risk include:  G. Thomas Goodnight 
and Sandy Green, “Rhetoric, Risk, and Markets: The Dot-Com Bubble,” 
Quarterly Journal of Speech 96 (2010): 115-140; Lisa Keränen, 
“Catastrophic Risk and the Production of Bio(in)security,” Western 
Journal of Communication 75 (2011): 451-472. 
15. Studies in the visual rhetoric of science include: Michelle 
Gibbons, “Seeing the Mind in the Matter: Functional Brain Imagine as 
Framed Visual Argument, Argumentation & Advocacy 43 (2007): 175-
188; Alan Gross, “Toward a Theory of Verbal-Visual Interaction: The 
Example of Lavoisier, Rhetoric Society Quarterly 39 (2009): 147-169; 
Jordynn Jack, “A Pedagogy of Sight, Microscopic Vision in Robert 
Hooke’s Micrographia,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 95 (2009): 192-
209; Lawrence Prelli, ed., Rhetorics of Display  (Columbia, SC: University 
of South Carolina Press, 2006); Lynda Walsh, “Before Climategate,” Poroi 
6 (2010): 3-33. 
16. Studies of mythic rhetorics of science and religion include: 
James Herrick, Scientific Mythologies: How Science and Science Fiction 
Forge New Religious Beliefs (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2008), 
Thomas Lessl, Rhetorical Darwinism: Religion, Evolution, and the 
Scientific Identity (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2012). 
 
